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Derivatives at Agricultural Banks 
Abstract 
Using data between 1995 and 2010, we find that agricultural banks are benefiting from the 
derivatives activities by reducing total risk without hurting their profit. In nonagricultural banks, 




Historically, the high cost of implementing hedging strategies creates the main barrier for small 
banks, especially agricultural banks, to participate in the derivatives market. Only agricultural 
banks part of bank holding companies may have the chance to hedge with derivatives contracts. 
However, changes in banking regulation in the 1990s made it possible for small agricultural 
banks to hedge. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994 removed the 
interstate branching limit, making possible affiliation of small agricultural banks with large 
banks and bank holding companies. The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 allowed the 
consolidation of commercial banks, insurance companies, security firms and investment banks, 
making it possible for the commercial banks to benefit from the economies of scope. 
Data shows that few agricultural banks (less than 10) participated in the derivatives 
markets before the deregulation in 2000, and that these banks used derivative contracts to hedge 
against interest rate only. Since 2000 agricultural banks begin to actively participate in the 
derivatives markets and by 2010 about 10% of agricultural banks participated in the derivatives 
market. 
 While end-user derivatives activities of commercial banks have been studied extensively, 3 
 
there is no research on the derivatives activities of agricultural banks. Agricultural banks are one 
of the main funding sources to the agricultural industry but are small, have less diversified loan 
portfolio, relatively new to the derivatives market, and thus more vulnerable to loss from the 
inappropriate hedging activities. However, Warner’s (1977) finding that the bankruptcy cost is 
proportionally greater for smaller firms suggesting that there are potential gains from hedging for 
small agricultural banks in terms of reduction in the probability of financial distress. Insight into 
effectiveness of hedging is therefore important for agricultural banks because of their unique 
traits. 
In this paper, we study the impact of derivatives on agricultural banks’ performance and 
compare it to that on nonagricultural banks’ performance. We also study whether use of 
derivatives affected negatively bank performance during the latest financial crisis and whether 
these effects were different before and after the change in regulation that incurred in 2000. 
The next section discusses the current literatures on derivatives contracts’ effects and 
agricultural banks. Section 3 discusses empirical models and data; and section 4 will discuss the 
empirical results.  Finally, section 5 will summarize and conclude the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
The literature on the effects of derivatives use on bank profitability and risk is somewhat 
ambiguous. For example, while Wilson and Holmann (1996) argue that derivatives have the 
potential to enhance profitability, apart from a few exceptions, empirical studies provide 
contradictory results. For example, Angbazo (1997) and Li and Yu (2010) find that derivatives 
use increase the profitability of commercial banks at the expense of the higher risks, while 
Brewer et al., (2001), Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), Sarkisyan et al., (2009) show that 4 
 
derivative activities have no effect on banks’ profitability.  
Since derivatives are used in risk management, most of the research focuses on testing 
whether the commercial banks’ derivatives activities help reduce their risk exposures. The 
empirical results on risk management in commercial banks are dependent on the measure of risks 
used. For example, when implied volatility is used as the risk measures, Li and Yu (2010) find 
that derivatives increase the investor’s risk perceptions toward the user bank, while Hassan and 
Khasawneh (2009a) indicate that investors perceive interest rate swap as risk reducing product. 
When risk is measured as the stock return sensitivity, Choi and Elyasiani (1997) find a strong 
risk reduction effect of derivatives on interest risk and foreign exchange risk for large banks. 
However, using a similar approach Hirtle (1997) finds that interest rate derivatives increase 
commercial banks’ interest rate risk exposure. When risks is measured by the volatility of stock 
return, Brewer et al. (1996) find the interest rate swap contract help reduce the volatility of the 
stock return for savings and loan associations (S&Ls) but the interest rate futures have no 
statistical significant effect.  Recently, Hassan and Khasawneh (2009a) compare the risk effects 
of different derivatives contracts based on three main risks measures: systematic risk (β), 
standard deviation of the stock returns, and implied volatility. They found that while interest rate 
swap contracts are risk reduction products across all three risks measures, the other derivatives 
contracts (option, future and forward) are positively correlated to systematic market risk (β).  
Using accounting ratios as measures of risk, Angbazo (1997) finds that derivatives activities 
are not associated with larger risk exposures in banks even though off-balance-sheet activities 
(which also includes standby letter of credit, loan sale etc.,) did increase the banks’ interest risk 
and liquidity risk during the sample period 1989-1993.  
Most studies of agricultural banks are motivated by the farm credit crisis in 1980s. 5 
 
Belongia and Gilbert (1990), argue that lack of diversification to assets other than loans and high 
portion of agricultural loans were the primary cause of the farm credit crisis, while affiliation 
with large bank holding companies was associated with lower probability of failure for 
agricultural banks. The large number of agricultural bank failures in response to the farm credit 
crisis and regulation changes brought a wave of consolidation in the agricultural industry since 
the 1980’s. Consequently, studies have explored banks efficiencies and economies of scale and 
scope as well as banks response to regulation changes removing restrictions of intrastate, 
interstate, and international banking (Belongia and Gilbert. 1990; Gilbert, 1991; and Ahrendsen 
et al., 1995, Featherstone and Moss, 1994; Neff et al., 1994; Dias and Helmers, 2001; Choi and 
Stefanou, 2006; Choi et al. 2007; and Settlage et al., 2009.   
As most derivatives user agricultural banks entered the market after the regulations 
changes in 1999 and 2000, and their small size makes them more vulnerable to the inappropriate 
hedging activities. Therefore, we believe it is worth to study the effects of derivative use by 
agricultural banks. In particular, we analyze the effects of derivatives use on profitability and risk 
in agricultural banks. The next section will discuss the data and theoretical models. 
 
Model  
Traditionally, commercial banks serve as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers, 
profiting from the difference of the interest they charge for loan borrowers and the interest they 
paid to the depositors, measured by net interest margin (NIM). However, since 1980s interest 
rate risks and market competition increased and commercial banks are reducing their loan 
business while noninterest income is having more impact on the banks’ operating revenue. In 
2010, around 31% of banks’ operating revenue came from noninterest income. To address these 6 
 
operation changes, we analyze the return on assets (ROA) which reflect banks’ total operating 
performance. Motivated by the dealership model developed by Ho and Saunders (1981) and 
Allen (1988) and following empirical model proposed by Angbazo (1997), the banks’ 
profitability (ROA) is modeled as a function of series of bank specific factors and risk factors.  
(1)          ROA   F Default risk; Interest risk;  Liquidity risk; Capital adequacy; 
  Management; Diversification risk; Asset; Derivatives  
The effects of derivatives activities on banks’ profitability could not be separated from its 
effect on the banks total risks. The two commonly used risk measures, volatility of common 
stock return (such as Hassan et al., 2009a and Brewer et al., 1996) and implied volatility which 
measures the investors’ perspectives on the commercial banks risk level (such as Hassan et al., 
2009a and Li and Yu, 2010) requires we use banks with publicly traded stocks and none of the 
publicly traded banks could be classified as agricultural banks given both definition from Federal 
Reserve (FED) or FDIC. Motivated by the hedging theory developed by Smith and Stulz (1985), 
which suggest that the hedging activities could help reduce the variation of the cash flow and 
thus reduce the probability of bankruptcy, the variation of the banks’ earnings (STDROA) could 
be used to measure the commercial banks’ total risk. The model to test the relationship between 
the banks’ total risk and derivatives activities is as follows: 
(2)          STDROA   F Default risk; Interest risk;  Liquidity risk; Capital adequacy; 
                                         Operating risks;Diversification risk; Asset; Derivatives  
Data and Variable Construction 
Bank data used to construct the models comes from Reports of Condition and Income (Call 
Report) from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The FAS no. 119 required all the commercial 
banks to disclose the purpose of derivatives activities since 1995. Therefore our sample includes 7 
 
64 quarterly observations from 1995 to 2010 for each bank included in the sample. In order to 
remove the bias and distractions from the banks’ merger and acquisition activities, the banks with 
less than 64 observations were excluded from the sample. The final dataset contains 5,285 banks 
with 330,990 observations.  
With regard to the agricultural banks, current literature contains two definitions. The FED 
defines agricultural banks as commercial banks with more than the mean agricultural loan ratio 
of the commercial banking industry (2,522 agricultural banks), while the FDIC has a more strict 
definition that banks with at least 25% loans to finance agriculture industry (including 
production loans and real estate loans secured by farmland) are classified as agricultural banks 
(2,147 agricultural banks). In this research, both classifications are used to test the consistency of 
the regression result. Moreover, the cost of funding and the scope of operations tend to be 
different across banks with different sizes. The commercial banks in the sample are also 
categorized into two groups by their total assets with total assets over $1 billion as large banks 
and otherwise as small banks or community banks.  
The risk factors entering the above models are consistent with the criteria used by FDIC 
to evaluate the commercial banks’ CAMELS
1 rating. The variable construction and expected 
signs are presented in Appendix.  
The default risk (or credit risk) is captured by the portion of the total assets which are 
classified as non-performing (NPL); interest risk is captured by the short term maturity gap 
(GAP) constructed with the method by Flannery and James (1984) with the difference of the 
banks’ short-term asset and liability scaled by earning asset; liquidity risk is measured by the 
proportion of the banks’ liquid assets to total assets (LIQUID); and capital adequacy is measured 
                                                 
1  The CAMELS rating system stands for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earning, liquidity and 
sensitivity to market risk. 8 
 
by the proportion of the banks’ total assets financed by equity capital (LEV). Following the 
method used by Angbazo (1997), management quality (MANAGE) is measured by the banks’ 
earning assets scaled by total assets in the profitability function and by the ratio of operating 
expense (include interest expense) to total income (OPERATE) in the risk function. Bank 
specific variables, banks’ total asset (ASSET) to control the scale economies and agricultural 
loan ratio (AGLN) to measure the diversification, are also included in the model. Other control 
variables include annualized quarterly inflation rate and seasonal dummies (D6, D9 and D12). 
Derivatives activities are approximated by the notional value of the derivatives contracts 
scaled by the banks’ total assets. Even though banks are required to report the derivatives 
activities by purpose with trading derivatives related to the market making activities (or 
dealership) and non-trading derivatives related to other purposes since 1995, there is no 
information on how to distinguish the hedging activities from the speculating activities. As cost 
of participating in the derivatives market is usually very high, small banks which usually face 
limited funding sources are unlikely to engage in speculation derivatives activities while large 
banks are assumed to engage in both speculation and hedging activities. Thus, the size of the 
bank is used to identify the hedging banks from the speculating banks. The next section discusses 
the empirical results. 
Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the key variables for the full sample. In general, the 
agricultural banks tend to be small in size with total assets of $48.2 million on average, 
compared to $144.2 million for the non-agricultural bank. Consistent with findings of previous 
studies, the agricultural banks are more profitable (1.2% ROA for agricultural banks and 1.03% 
for non-agricultural banks), more liquid (34% liquid asset for agricultural banks, but only 30% 9 
 
for nonagricultural banks), have fewer nonperforming loans (0.75% for agricultural banks but 
0.80% for nonagricultural banks) and are less leveraged (11.5% assets are funded by equity 
capital but only 10.5% for nonagricultural banks) than the nonagricultural banks. However, 
agricultural banks have bigger interest risks measured by the maturity gap (37% for agricultural 
banks but 34% for nonagricultural banks). Accordingly, their income is more volatile than the 
nonagricultural banks (standard deviation of the ROA is 1.1% for agricultural banks but only 
0.85% for non-agricultural banks).  
*********Table 1******** 
Compared to nonagricultural banks, agricultural banks are much less active in the 
derivatives market. Notional value of the non-trading derivatives for agricultural banks is only 
about 8% of their total assets, compared to 35% for non-agricultural banks. Because most of the 
agricultural banks only serve rural or local community business, they are not exposed to many 
foreign exchange risks and do not participate extensively in the foreign exchange derivatives 
activities. Unlike the nonagricultural banks which mainly use interest rate contracts, agricultural 
banks use the derivatives based primarily on equity.  
Derivatives Activities, Profitability and Total Risk 
Commercial banks usually make risk management and daily operationsdecisions jointly, and risk 
management activities are supposed to be endogenous with the factors which also affect the bank’ 
performance. To control for endogeneity, following the procedures used by Hanweck and Ryu 
(2005) and Brock and Franken (2003), all the explanatory variables are lagged in the ROA 
equation. Similarly, because banks actively manage their risk exposure, one period lag is also 
applied to all the explanatory variables in the risk equation.  
Panel regression models are used to analyze the effect of derivatives activities on the 10 
 
banks’ profitability. Hausman-Wu test rejects random difference across banks over time and 
suggests that the fixed effect for the profitability model. The fixed effect regression results are 
reported for the profitability function in Table 3. The standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level to control for the possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Because the total risk is 
measured as the time-series standard deviation of the profitability for each bank, the single cross-
sectional model is estimated and results are presented in Table 4. 
*******Table 2******** 
*******Table 3******** 
Meanwhile, only around 10% of the commercial banks could be classified as large banks 
(assets greater than $1 billion) with only 48 agricultural banks given the Fed definition and 26 by 
the FDIC definition. Thus, regression with all banks mainly captured the behavior of the small 
banks and the following discussion focuses on the group comparisons i.e. agricultural vs. 
nonagricultural banks and large vs. small banks.  
As expected, the profitability of commercial banks are negatively correlated to the default 
risk (NPL) with the magnitude for nonagricultural banks almost twice of that for agricultural 
banks (0.34% for nonagricultural banks but 0.18% for agricultural banks). However, the 
statistically significant effect of NPL on risks is only detected for nonagricultural banks. This 
result could be explained by the fact that the agricultural banks usually focus on serving the local 
business community and already know the risks of communities, thus could manage their loan 
quality more efficiently. 
The interest rate risk management is efficient for the commercial banking industry in that 
the total risk of the banking industry is unaffected by the interest rate risk exposure (GAP) and 
the total risk of the large agricultural banks even decreases as their interest rate risk exposure 11 
 
increases. The profitability of the commercial banks is not significantly correlated to the liquidity 
risks (LIQUID) and capital base (LEV). As expected, the increase in the liquid asset holdings 
reduces the overall risk for the commercial banking industry, especially for small banks. But 
against our expectation, the increase in the capital base increases the overall risk of the banks. 
One explanation for this result is that the higher required return on equity capital provides the 
incentives for the management make the investment in the high risk and high return assets. As 
expected, the management quality is positively correlated to the profitability and total risk.  
The results suggest that small agricultural banks could boost their profitability by 
spinning off assets without affecting total risk level, while large agricultural banks could benefit 
from an increase in size with high profitability or reduced total risk. However, the effects on 
nonagricultural banks are mixed. The benefits in profitability by spinning off assets are at the 
expense of higher total risk. Thus, the management’s preference for risk or profit matters in this 
case. The agricultural loans (AGLN) are desirable investments for small banks because such 
loans will help increase the profitability and reduce the variation of income. However, the 
performance of large agricultural banks is neutral to such loans in term of both profitability and 
total risk. Consistent with the findings by Hanweck and Ryu (2005), evidence of seasonality (D6, 
D9 and D12) is also detected across bank groups. The nonagricultural banks tend to 
underperform the first quarter in the second quarter, while agricultural banks, especially small 
agricultural banks, tend to outperform in the third quarter. In the last quarter, all banks tend to 
underperform the first quarter. For the effects of derivatives activities, agricultural banks, 
especially small agricultural banks, are benefiting from the swaps contract (SWAP) in terms of 
risk reductions without hurting the profitability. However, the performance of the nonagricultural 
banks is hurt by the swaps contract in terms of increased total risk and reduced profitability. 12 
 
Except for a few large agricultural banks whose variation of income is smoothed by option 
contracts (OPTION), the performance of the agricultural banks is neutral to option contracts in 
terms of both profitability and total risk. Even though nonagricultural banks are benefiting from 
option contracts in terms of higher profitability, such benefits are at the expense of higher risk. 
For the effects of future and forward contracts (FUTURE), only risk levels of large banks are 
affected with risk reduction effect for large nonagricultural banks but opposite effect for large 
agricultural banks.  
These results suggest that agricultural banks, especially small agricultural banks, are 
benefiting from the derivatives activities in terms of risk reduction. However, while 
nonagricultural banks are benefiting from the derivatives use in terms of profitability, such 
benefits are at the expense of increased variation of income. Based on the assumption that the 
larger the bank’s size the more likely it is for the banks to speculate on the derivatives contracts 
and the fact that the agricultural banks are usually small in size, agricultural banks use 
derivatives mainly to hedge risks but nonagricultural banks may engage in some speculation 
activities. We could speculate then that hedging helped commercial banks reduce the variation of 
income, while the speculating derivative activities increased total risk and reduced profitability. 
These results are consistent with the fact that large banks, which have large portion of 
speculating derivatives, were in more trouble during the financial crisis in 2008. In contrast, 
agricultural banks, especially the small agricultural banks, efficiently managed their risk 
exposures effectively via derivatives contracts. 
********Table 4********* 
The banking regulation change in 2000 and the financial crisis 2008 affected banks 
operational performance and derivatives activities dramatically. Structure changes with these two 13 
 
events are detected by a Chow test.  Table 5 presents the regression results for the model of 
structural change for agricultural banks. Before banking deregulation, the profitability of 
agricultural banks was boosted by the future and forward derivatives without hurting total risk. 
After the deregulation, agricultural banks master the hedging techniques gradually and enjoy the 
risk reduction effects by using swaps contracts; but the arbitrage benefits disappear as the 
derivatives market is used more than ever before. Meanwhile, the swaps contracts effectively 
reduce the volatility of the agricultural banks’ profitability without hurting their profit during the 
recession period. These results reinforce the assumption that the small banks, especially small 
agricultural banks, only use derivatives to hedge and their hedging strategies help reduce the 
volatility of the profitability effectively.  
Conclusion 
This research studies the effects of derivatives activities on agricultural banks and compares the 
results with that for nonagricultural banks. Given the assumption that the larger the banks the 
more likely they are to speculate in the derivatives market, the agricultural banks, usually small 
in size, are benefiting from the hedging derivatives activities in term of risk reduction. The model 
exhibits a structural change due to the change in banking regulation in 2000 and the financial 
crisis in 2008. The results imply that small agricultural banks already obtained hedging skill with 
derivatives even though they were relatively new to the market and that the derivatives activities 
actually helped agricultural banks through the financial crisis in 2008 in terms of risk reduction. 
In contrast, by engaging in speculating derivatives activities, nonagricultural banks, especially 
large banks, were hurt by increased risk level and reduced profitability. These findings support 
the current regulation, so called “Volker Rule’ which restricts commercial banks from taking 
speculative positions in derivatives trading unless on behalf of their clients. We therefore 14 
 
conclude that the purpose of the derivatives matters. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable (%)  POOL  NONAG FEDAG AG 
ROA 1.08 1.03 1.18 1.20 
STDROA 0.92 0.85 1.01 1.09 
Risk Factor 
NPL 0.78 0.80 0.75 0.75 
LIQUID 31.62 30.43 34.22 34.41 
MANAGE 92.59 92.40 92.93 93.04 
OPERAT 77.93 78.05 77.60 77.65 
GAP 34.63 33.66 36.73 36.95 
LEV 10.84 10.49 11.47 11.65 
Control Variable 
ASSET* $104.40 $144.19 $56.20 $48.20 
AGLN 17.83 5.98 41.28 46.34 
INF 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 
Derivatives 
By Purpose 
TRADING 0.036 0.047 0.010 0.011 
NONTRADING 0.267 0.358 0.084 0.055 
By Contract 
COMMODITY 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
EQUITY 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.014 
FE 0.012 0.018     <0.001  0 
INTEREST 0.279 0.377 0.080 0.050 
By Product 
FUTURE 0.081 0.106 0.025 0.021 
OPTION 0.153 0.204 0.045 0.032 
SWAP 0.147 0.204 0.027 0.015 
*: US Dollar value in millions 
 
  Table 2 Panel Regression for ROA 
 
 Pool  Large Small 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES Pooled  NONAG  AG  FDIC  Pooled  NONAG  AG  FDIC  Pooled  NONAG  AG  FDIC 
CONSTANT 1.016***  1.102***  -0.144  -0.279  1.470*  1.424 3.805  5.144 0.655**  0.722**  -0.157  -0.287 
 (0.241)  (0.288)  (0.424)  (0.385)  (0.878)  (0.904)  (3.719) (5.153) (0.258) (0.313) (0.428) (0.386) 
NPL -0.305***  -0.341***  -0.183***  -0.170***  -0.454***  -0.453*** -0.343*  -0.181**  -0.289***  -0.324***  -0.182***  -0.170*** 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.177) (0.075) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
GAP -0.001**  -0.003***  -0.0005*** -0.0004***  -0.005***  -0.005*** -0.001  -0.0002  -0.001**  -0.003***  -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0011)  (0.0012) (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
LIQUID 0.0003  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  -0.005 -0.007  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LEV 0.008  0.008  0.004  0.006  0.027  0.028  -0.009 -0.006  0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
MANAGE 0.025***  0.025***  0.020***  0.021***  0.026***  0.027*** -0.025  -0.061  0.025***  0.025***  0.021***  0.021*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.038) (0.056) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ASSET -0.180***  -0.176***  -0.060**  -0.057**  -0.185***  -0.188*** 0.006  0.150** -0.150***  -0.143***  -0.060**  -0.058** 
 (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.074) (0.070) (0.016) (0.018) (0.029) (0.025) 
AGLN 0.001  -0.001  0.004***  0.004***  -0.005  -0.005 0.006  0.007  0.002* 0.000  0.004***  0.004*** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
INF 0.003***  0.001  0.003***  0.003***  0.001  0.001  -0.001 0.002  0.003***  0.001  0.003***  0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D6 -0.023***  -0.029***  -0.002  -0.001  -0.069*  -0.073* 0.087  0.112 -0.018***  -0.022***  -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.068) (0.087) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
D9 -0.004  -0.010 0.021*** 0.018** -0.046 -0.051* 0.083 0.108 0.0001 -0.004 0.021*** 0.018** 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.071) (0.098) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
D12 -0.295***  -0.250***  -0.373***  -0.394***  -0.196***  -0.198*** -0.183*  -0.141  -0.295***  -0.248***  -0.373***  -0.395*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.097) (0.130) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) 
SWAP -0.016  -0.017  -0.003  -0.007  -0.019*  -0.020* -0.005**  -0.005  -0.036** -0.036**  -0.006  -0.013 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
OPTION 0.005**  0.005**  0.003  0.001  0.009**  0.008* 0.002  -0.007 0.005**  0.005**  0.003  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
FUTURE 0.001  0.001  -0.004  -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.021 -0.044 -0.001  -0.001  -0.005  -0.0004 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.024) (0.252) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) 
R-squared  0.111 0.129 0.069  0.070  0.171 0.171 0.094  0.086  0.105 0.122 0.069 0.071 
Observations 330,990  232,549  123,422  98,441  27,212 26,567  1,091  645  318,309  220,006  123,096  98,303 
Number of entity  5,285  4,230  2,522  2,147  452  448  48  26  5,220  4,164  2,513  2,143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 Regression for Risk 
 
 Pool  Large  Small 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES  Pooled  NONAG  AG  FDIC Pooled  NONAG AG  FDIC Pooled  NONAG AG  FDIC 
CONSTANT -13.213**  -1.033***  -9.461**  -7.937  -4.643**  -3.323** 7.468*  7.460  -12.050*** -0.509**  -11.595**  -9.444* 
 (5.694)  (0.234)  (4.437)  (5.422)  (1.901)  (1.523)  (3.961) (6.918) (3.338) (0.253) (4.525) (5.470) 
NPL 0.094  0.452***  -0.181  -0.252  0.740***  0.734*** 0.144  -0.533  0.065 0.410*** -0.169  -0.244 
 (0.169)  (0.021)  (0.299)  (0.361)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.260) (0.476) (0.171) (0.021) (0.300) (0.361) 
GAP -0.009  0.0005  -0.008  -0.006  -0.0002  <-0.0001  -0.054*** -0.059**  -0.010*  <0.0001  -0.004  -0.005 
 (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.011) (0.023) (0.006) (0.001) (0.011) (0.013) 
LIQUID -0.040***  -0.004***  -0.089***  -0.091***  0.005  0.004  0.022  0.012  -0.038*** -0.003*** -0.090*** -0.091*** 
 (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.017) (0.026) (0.008) (0.001) (0.016) (0.018) 
LEV  0.581*** 0.091***  0.808***  0.845*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 0.555*** 0.083*** 0.844*** 0.871*** 
 (0.025)  (0.003)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.031) (0.047) (0.024) (0.003) (0.044) (0.048) 
OPERATE 0.053***  0.013***  0.082***  0.078**  0.029***  0.029***  -0.020 -0.050  0.050***  0.011***  0.085***  0.079** 
 (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.027) (0.047) (0.012) (0.001) (0.029) (0.033) 
ASSET 0.085  -0.029**  -0.001  -0.062  -0.133**  -0.116** -0.520***  -0.362  0.035  -0.049***  0.128  0.053 
 (0.103)  (0.013)  (0.243)  (0.297)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.187) (0.326) (0.119) (0.015) (0.250) (0.302) 
AGLN -0.014***  -0.010***  -0.040***  -0.054***  -0.013*  -0.020* -0.005  -0.021  -0.014***  -0.011***  -0.040***  -0.055*** 
 (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.015) (0.023) (0.005) (0.002) (0.012) (0.015) 
INF 1.830  0.020  -0.062  -0.111  1.381**  0.752  -0.009 0.782 1.822 0.024 -0.054  -0.163 
 (2.221)  (0.018)  (0.249)  (0.418)  (0.666)  (0.485)  (0.210) (0.557) (1.189) (0.018) (0.249) (0.419) 
SWAP -0.029  0.051***  -0.428**  -1.080***  0.021**  0.022***  -0.047 -0.171 -0.106  0.069***  -0.988***  -1.124*** 
 (0.055)  (0.006)  (0.207)  (0.352)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.036) (0.115) (0.070) (0.008) (0.319) (0.363) 
OPTION 0.035  0.048***  0.086  0.239  0.116***  0.110*** -0.165**  -0.799  0.070  0.030***  0.059  0.222 
 (0.061)  (0.006)  (0.352)  (1.050)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.076) (2.151) (0.052) (0.006) (0.329) (1.050) 
FUTURE 0.015  -0.030***  0.397  0.058  -0.062***  -0.059***  0.864**  -3.276 0.016 -0.004 0.052 0.018 
 (0.088)  (0.010)  (0.963)  (1.012)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.402) (8.955) (0.160) (0.018) (0.999) (1.011) 
R-squared  0.100 0.302  0.134  0.142 0.517 0.525 0.781 0.887 0.096 0.294 0.138 0.144 
Observations 330,988  232,547  123,422  98,441  27,212  26,567  1,091  645  318,307 220,004 123,096  98,303 
Number  of  entity 5,285 4,230  2,522  2,147  452  448  48  26  5,220 4,164 2,513 2,143 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Model Structure Change 
 
 Recession  Regulation  Change 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















Constant 2.295**  -0.506  -18.401***  -5.570 2.982*** 1.013* 1.896***  -8.207* 
 (0.914)  (0.438)  (4.634)  (4.415)  (0.681) (0.548) (0.377)  (4.377) 
NPL -0.255***  -0.164***  -0.319  -0.234 -0.078***  -0.218***  0.161*** -0.070 
 (0.031)  (0.011)  (0.285)  (0.289)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)  (0.273) 
GAP -0.003***  -0.0004***  0.008  -0.005 -0.0001  -0.0004*** 0.002* -0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.0001)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.001) (0.009) 
LIQUID 0.004*  -0.0002  -0.115***  -0.093*** -0.001  0.004***  -0.006*** -0.091***
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.016) 
LEV -0.037***  0.008  1.287***  0.855***  -0.035*** -0.004 0.067***  1.024*** 
 (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.059)  (0.042)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.048) 
MANAGE 0.021***  0.021***      0.014***  0.021***     
 (0.004)  (0.002)      (0.004)  (0.003)     
ASSET -0.244***  -0.026  0.369  -0.039  -0.249*** -0.160*** -0.191*** -0.053 
 (0.060)  (0.030)  (0.262)  (0.241)  (0.052) (0.038) (0.020)  (0.251) 
AGLN 0.007**  0.003***  -0.058***  -0.039***  0.001  0.002  -0.005*** -0.050***
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.012) 
INF 0.006***  0.003**  0.301*  -1.640***  0.006** 0.003***  -0.007  -0.083 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.170)  (0.363)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.045)  (0.231) 
OPERATE     0.073***  0.082***      0.005**  0.042* 
 (0.027) (0.028)  (0.003) (0.025)
D6 -0.141***  0.022**      0.004  -0.016     
 (0.032)  (0.010)      (0.013)  (0.013)     
D9 -0.151***  0.033***      0.040***  0.012     
 (0.038)  (0.008)      (0.010)  (0.010)     
D12 -0.469***  -0.370***      -0.406***  -0.340***     
 (0.035)  (0.015)      (0.017)  (0.017)     
SWAP 0.004  -0.005*  -0.813***  -0.074  -0.018  0.009  0.061  -0.362** 
 (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.214)  (0.261)  (0.012) (0.008) (0.062)  (0.168) 
OPTION 0.026  -0.001  0.089  0.043 -0.031  0.009  0.087 0.124 
 (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.239)  (0.436)  (0.028) (0.006) (0.067)  (0.304) 
FUTURE -0.020  -0.004  -0.084  0.143 0.029*** -0.003  -0.246  0.347 
 (0.037)  (0.010)  (0.602)  (1.043)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.339)  (0.683) 
R-squared 0.057  0.073  0.186  0.156 0.077  0.066  0.206 0.168 
Observations  17,422 106,000 17,422  106,000  46,320  77,102  46,320  77,102 
Number of entity  2,235  2,513  2,235  2,513  2,302  2,356  2,302  2,356 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 20 
 
Appendix: Empirical Model Variables 
Variables Calculation  Predicted  Signs  in Profit  Predicted Signs in Risk 
Dependent Variable      
Risk  STDROA    ∑  ROA    R O A             
 
T 1
  - - 
Profitability  ROA  
Net Income
Total Asset
  - - 
Explanatory Variable      
Capital Adequacy  LEV  
Equity Capital
Total Asset
  Positive Negative 
Liquidity Risk  LIQUID  
Current Asset
Total Asset
  Negative Negative 
Default Risk  NPL  
Nonperforming Loan
Total Asset
  Negative Positive 
Interest Risk  GAP  
Net Short   term Asset
Earning Asset
  Negative Positive 
Management  MANAGE  
Earning Asset
Total Asset
  Positive - 
Operating Risk  OPERATE  
Operating Expense
Operating Revenue
  - Positive 
Control Variable      
Diversification Risk  AGLN  
Agricultural Loan
Total Asset
  - - 
Scale ASSET=ln(Asset)  -  Negative 
Inflation  INF  
CPI   C P I    
CPI   
- - 
Derivative Variable      
Swap  SWAP  
Swap
Total Asset
  Positive Negative 
Option  OPTION  
Option Write   Option Purchase
Total Asset
  Positive Negative 
Future and Forward  SWAP  
Future   Forward
Total Asset
  Positive Negative 
Note: Data used in this study are from FDIC’s Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report). 